Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 2

Article 5

Test Data Protection: Different Approaches and
Implementation in Pharmaceuticals
Wael Armouti
Mohammad F. A. Nsour

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Repository Citation
Wael Armouti and Mohammad F. A. Nsour, Test Data Protection: Different Approaches and Implementation in Pharmaceuticals, 20 Marq.
Intellectual Property L. Rev. 267 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol20/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

NSOUR.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/2017 12:06 AM

TEST DATA PROTECTION: DIFFERENT
APPROACHES AND IMPLEMENTATION IN
PHARMACEUTICALS
WAEL ARMOUTI AND MOHAMMAD F. A. NSOUR**
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 268
II. DIFFERENT PROTECTION APPROACHES ............................................ 269
A. Bans on Misappropriation ..................................................... 269
B. Compensatory regime or cost-sharing approach
to registration data .............................................................. 271
1. Overview of Cost-Sharing Approach ............................. 271
2. Compliance with Article 39.3 ......................................... 271
3. Advantages of Cost-Sharing Approach .......................... 271
4. Problems with Cost-Sharing Approach .......................... 272
5. Issues with Calculating Costs Under this Approach...... 273
a. The Simple Division Royalties Model ...................... 274
b. The Readjustable Royalties Model ........................... 275
6. How U.S. Utilizes Cost-Sharing Approach .................... 276
7. Cost-Sharing approach & Developing Countries ........... 276
C. Data Exclusivity Approach ................................................... 276
1. Data Exclusivity versus Patent ....................................... 278
2. Effect of Data Exclusivity on Compulsory License ....... 283
D. Public Health Variants of the Data-Exclusivity Approach ... 284
III. TEST DATA PROTECTION IMPLEMENTATION IN
DIFFERENT COUNTRIES .............................................................. 286
A. United States ......................................................................... 287
B. Canada ................................................................................... 289
C. The European Union ............................................................. 291
D. India ...................................................................................... 294
E. Egypt ..................................................................................... 296
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 296

* L.L.M in Intellectual Property Law, Faculty of Law, the University of Jordan, Legal Affairs
Director at Jordan Food and Drug Administration (JFDA).
** Attorney, Associate Law Professor, University of Jordan.

NSOUR.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

268

4/10/2017 12:06 AM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 20:2

I. INTRODUCTION
Binding on all members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”)1 aimed to create a standard of international property protection.2 In
particular, Article 39.3 of TRIPS requires WTO members to protect the secret
test data that originator pharmaceutical companies submit for regulatory
approval of New Chemical Entities (NCE) against “disclosure” and “unfair
commercial use.”3 Notably, however, Article 39.3 goes no further in defining
these constitutive terms, a deliberate maneuver designed to give WTO members
the freedom to interpret the parameters of the Article’s prohibition against
disclosure and unfair commercial use. In effect, this latitude allows members
to set their own rules and to implement the Article by adopting an approach that
takes account of national individuality.
The importance of the interpretive freedom that Article 39.3 allows WTO
members is reflected in the varied approaches to test data protection adopted
by member countries: test data protection approaches differ along the lines of
how the “unfair commercial use” obligation found in Article 39.3 is construed.
Some of these approaches are considered public health-friendly more than data
exclusivity.4 In practice, the permissive language of Article 39.3 permits a
government to authorize a generic product based on an earlier grant of
regulatory approval for the original product without running afoul of the
Article’s prohibition on disclosing test data submitted by the original
company.5
This article discusses different protection approaches. The first approach
bans any policy that ultimately allows direct entry of generic products (i.e.
misappropriation). The second approach is a cost-sharing mechanism that
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm. For a general
outline of the TRIPS Agreement, see Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2016).
2. The World Trade Organization is an organization that facilitates trade relationships between
nations, as well as a forum in which governments can negotiate trade agreements. What Is the WTO?,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/index.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
Operating under a system of global trade rules, the WTO functions as place for governments to resolve
trade problems and settle trade-related disputes. Id.
3. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.
4. Anthony Taubman, Unfair Competition and the Financing of Public-Knowledge Goods: The
Problem of Test Data Protection, 3 OXFORD J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 594, 595 (2008).
5. Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exlusivity Under United States and European Union Law,
59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 484–485 (2004).
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ensures higher political acceptance and still meets the obligations of Article
39.3 of the TRIPS agreement to prevent unfair commercial use. The third
approach is protecting clinical pharmaceutical test data submitted to regulatory
agencies from generic drug manufacturing application (i.e. data exclusivity).
Under the data exclusivity approach, a comparison to patents and their relation
to compulsory license are discussed. The fourth approach allows releasing the
data exclusively protected in certain public health variants, which mitigate the
effect of data exclusivity.
After discussing these distinct approaches to test data protection, I will then
consider the implementation of test data protection in the United States,
Canada, and the European Union. I will conclude by comparing these
approaches with the demonstrably less restrictive approaches to test data
protection employed by both India and Egypt.
II. DIFFERENT PROTECTION APPROACHES
A. Bans on Misappropriation
Taking maximum advantage of the flexibilities afforded by the broad
language of the TRIPS Agreement, this first approach is considered to facilitate
the early entry of a generic product directly after the original product is
approved.6 Operationally, the ban-on-misappropriation approach prohibits
government officials from disclosing an originator’s submitted test data to a
third party, but it empowers them to rely on these data to grant marketing
approval of a generic product.7 This approach finds legitimacy in several areas.
Initially, the predicate interpretation of “unfair commercial use” utilized is
consistent with the text of Article 39.3. Here, unfairness is limited to the means
of access to the data by the competitor, not by the regulators.8 Furthermore,
according to Article 39.3 of the TRIPS agreement, it is required to protect test
data in accordance with domestic laws of unfair competition.9 Thus, the
originator’s test data will be protected against that which the relevant national
law defines as unfair use of the data.10 Under this scenario, reliance on original
test data when assessing the bioequivalence study of a generic company will
not be considered to be an unfair use.
In general, the ban-on-misappropriation approach is considered to be a
6. Anthony Taubman, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.
10. Pamela Andanda, Managing Intellectual Property Rights Over Clinical Trial Data to
Promote Access and Benefit Sharing in Public Health, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 140, 147 (2013).
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valuable alternative to the data exclusivity approach for developing countries;11
some countries—Argentina, for example—recognized the advantages of test
data protection and consequently went on to implement the approach.12 Two
such advantages include (1), the generic product will reach the market as
quickly as possible, with no need to repeat the clinical test data; and (2), it is a
simple approach to implement, because no regulatory burdens are imposed on
the government.13
Conversely, numerous arguments have been leveled against this
approach. First, the ban-on-misappropriation approach will undermine
originator companies’ investments in Research & Development (R&D).
Second, this strategy will deny fair return to originator companies by allowing
generic companies to unfairly free ride on their investment.14 However, both
of these alleged failings of the ban-on-misappropriation approach may be of
limited applicability in the milieu of a developing country.15 In such countries,
the originator already has a large incentive to conduct R&D under a patent
system. Also, developing countries have a small share of the global
pharmaceutical market, so their policies will not affect the R&D investment
decisions of the originator companies.16
Additionally, implementing a strong intellectual property system does
not affect the decision of the originator companies to invest more in those
countries.17 On the contrary, we can see that originator companies have made
many investments in Egypt, which offers limited IP protection but have not
made such investments in Jordan, which has adopted an expansive IP protection
program.18
Model language for the misappropriation approach is “[g]overnment
authorities shall prohibit misappropriation of test or other data submitted to
obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products
which utilize new chemical entities, except where necessary to protect the
public; government authorities shall not disclose such data.”19

11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Robert Weissman, Public Health-Friendly Options for Protecting Pharmaceutical
Registration Data, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 113, 115–17 (2006).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Rohit Malpani, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-Plus Intellectual Property Rules in the
US-Jordan FTA Affect Access to Medicines, 102 OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 5 (2007),
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%20no%20benefits.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Weissman, supra note 14, at 118.
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B. Compensatory regime or cost-sharing approach to registration data
1. Overview of Cost-Sharing Approach
According to this cost-sharing approach to data protection, a generic
company may rely on the originator’s submitted test data in its bid to attain
regulatory approval if, and only if, the generic company offers fair
compensation for the data to the originator company.20 The key elements of
this approach are: the cost of generating data must be documented;21 the generic
company will pay a share of the costs apportioned to each national market; 22
and avoiding overcompensation for originator data by taking into account the
following criteria:23 if the originator product is covered by a patent, then no
compensation will be paid.24
If the sales of the originator product earn multiple (20 times) its cost in
generating test data, then no compensation from generic companies.25
The right to compensation expires five years after the originator product
obtained marketing approval.26 The generic company will pay for the period
they will be using the data during the course of the five years.27
2. Compliance with Article 39.3
The cost-sharing approach meets Article 39.3 obligations to prevent unfair
commercial use.
3. Advantages of Cost-Sharing Approach
The cost-sharing approaches has numerous advantages.28
It will avoid the free-rider problem,29 as it requires the generic companies
to share the cost of the clinical trials done by the originator company.30
It will encourage the originator to invest more in developing new

20. Id.
21. Weissman, supra note 14, at 112–124.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id..
28. Brandon Powell, Silence Is Not the Best Medicine: Requiring Disclosure of Clinical Trial
Data for Abandoned Drugs, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 571, 591 (2012). See also FDA 101: Clinical Trials
and Institutional Review Boards, FDA (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/Consume
rUpdates/ucm134723.htm.
29. See id.
30. Id.
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products.31
It adds value to abandoned drugs; an originator company can benefit from
its abandoned products because it will receive a percentage of the gross sales
from the competitor who wishes to proceed in this drug.32
It will reduce the costs of drug development, since the cost-sharing system
compensates a company for research that otherwise would have generated zero
income for it. As a result of this compensation, the company will in turn charge
a lower price for the drug,33 with the aggregate effect of this causal relationship
being industry-wide cost reductions.
It will benefit the scientific community because this approach mandates the
disclosure of the test data; consequently, knowledge will be increased,
resources are conserved and more drugs will be produced.34
4. Problems with Cost-Sharing Approach
The principal problem with this regime is that this fair compensation
requirement may exceed generic companies’ financial capacity. There are
disadvantages of the cost sharing approach.35
The system is complicated or difficult to administer.36 However, any such
administrative difficulties are lessened when the cost-sharing system at issue
allows a generic producer to establish an automatic right to rely on originators’
data; in this scenario, the only dispute or administrative difficulty will concern
the amount of compensation. Even on this potential administrative morass, the
U.S.’s approach to handling the amount of compensation points to ways to
simplify the process of compensation.37 Moreover, there is a suggestion that
the Drug Regulatory Authority should substitute a royalty payment. 38
Other disadvantages include over-compensating of originator companies
for test data, which consequently increases the cost charged to consumers.39
The response to this objection is that the actual cost for the generic companies
will be modest, especially in smaller market.40

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Weissman, supra note 14, at 120–24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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5. Issues with Calculating Costs Under this Approach
Most disputes under the cost-sharing system concern how to calculate
the actual costs of generating test data incurred by the originator company. In
practice, dispute arbitrators will usually reduce the estimates submitted by the
originator company.41 To resolve disputes over the validity of a particular
company’s estimates, two predicate questions must be addressed. First, what is
the appropriate methodology with which to calculate the originator company’s
expenditure? Second, does this estimate include the cost of failed molecules?
As to the second inquiry regarding the financial value of an originator
company’s failed attempts, it is important to determine the extent to which the
failed efforts ultimately contributed to the successful molecule’s market entry.42
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA)
report that for every 5,000 drugs tested, an average of only five make it to
clinical trials, and only one of these is ultimately approved for patient use.43
This data confirms that such failed efforts are a common occurrence. Thus, the
data lends validity to the originator company’s attempt to pass some portion of
the costs associated therewith onto a generic producer. Though a generic
producer may seek to utilize the originator’s final test data, this sought-after
information may owe its existence to the lessons learned from earlier failed
attempts.
Another question involving how to calculate the originator’s costs
considers what is the appropriate percentage of said costs to be allotted to each
company. Specifically, should the apportionment be similar for all companies
in all countries,44 regardless of both the country’s market share? Should this
determination consider how many generic competitors are requesting
marketing approval, or how long the originator product has been in the
market?45
Mr. Robert Weissman drafted a model for the cost-sharing approach, in
which a generic company will pay a percentage of the originator’s documented
cost that is based on the market share in which the generic product will be
41. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Article: Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPS Agreement, 45
HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 479 (2004).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Jerome H. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data Under the TRIPS Agreement and
Its Progeny: A Broader Perspective, ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Moving Pro-development IP
Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods in Health, Education and Learning, Bellagio, Nov. 29–Dec.
3, 2004, available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Reichman_Bellagio4.pdf.
45. Id.
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sold.46 Under the Weissman cost-sharing model, compensation will be divided
according to the number of generic companies seeking marketing approval.47
The amount of compensation will be subject to case-by-case negotiation, and
will not stand in the way of a generic use or of reliance on the data to obtain
marketing approval.48
A simple model was proposed to avoid litigation, in which the generic
companies pay reasonable royalty from their gross sales for a specified period,
not to exceed five years.49 In this model, compensation correlated to its value
to each generic company, a valuation based upon its sales. Until 1992, Canada
used to impose a four percent royalty on the right to use patented
pharmaceuticals.50 The royalty percentage can vary according to each country,
from one to four percent. In other words, the disadvantage of this model is the
overcompensation of the originator company.51
Additionally, there are two other notable models of cost calculation: the
Simple Divisions Royalties Model and the more-sophisticated Readjustable
Royalties Model. The following discussion of these two models utilizes an
analysis by Professor Fellmeth.
a. The Simple Division Royalties Model
In this model, all drug registrants will pay fixed cost-sharing. Here, the
originator company has the burden to prove the cost of submitted trials required
to gain the drug marketing approval.52 Once validated, this cost will then be
divided by the number of the registrants in any given year,53 and all registrants
will share an equal percentage of the total cost.54
The difference between the Simple Division Royalties Model and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) is that no exclusivity period will
be provided for the originator company, which allows a generic company to
request registration immediately after proving that its product is bioequivalent
to the originator’s.55 Also, this model differs from the FIFRA model by having

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International
Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
1, 31–32 (2009).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Fellmeth, supra note 41, at 481–82.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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a fixed cost-sharing, and it will not involve any arbitral procedure that will
delay the entrance of the generic product.56
A significant disadvantage of this model is that the generic company will
have to pay a large percentage of the clinical trials cost, a cost which generic
companies in developing countries cannot afford.57 Moreover, this model does
not account for all the generic producers requesting marketing approval.
Predictably, not all generic producers will enter the market at exactly the same
time; the Simple Divisions Royalties Model, however, does not address the
staggered market entry of generic producers and the calculation protocol this
model does provide would create a messy procedure in the calculation of the
right percentage.58
This model’s insufficiency is further demonstrated by the point that some
generic companies may not enter the market after gaining the marketing
approval, so it is not fair to correlate it to marketing approval if no real
marketing has happened.59
b. The Readjustable Royalties Model
This model links the market access benefits with the costs obtaining this
access.60 The subsequent generic companies will pay a royalty for
predetermined years after gaining marketing approval. Many mathematical
formulae were proposed to apply this model. One of these formulae proposes
a higher royalty on the first generic companies, as they will gain the greatest
benefits. Under this calculus, companies will eventually be paid a lower royalty
as the benefit they will gain will be less from the initial ones.61 In this proposed
formula, the originator will not recover more than the 80% of its cost, and the
higher the number of generic competitors, the more of its cost will be
recovered.62
The flexibility of this model is one of its key strengths, as formulae can be
changed to allow negotiation on critical issues, such as how many generic
companies should pay the royalty, and for how long the royalty should be paid.
Moreover, this model ensures that the originator will not recover more than
100% of its real cost.63 If applied properly, this model will foster competition
in the market and will disperse the cost of the clinical trials among all available
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id..
Id.
Id. at 482–99.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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competitors.64
6. How U.S. Utilizes Cost-Sharing Approach
This approach is consistent with the U.S.’s position and ensures higher
political acceptance.65 U.S. law has already established a version of the costsharing approach for agricultural chemical registration under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).66 The difference is that
in this model, there is an exclusive period, which is followed by an automatic
right to use the registration data after paying compensation royalties.
It may be noted that cost-sharing approach did not appear in any FTA
signed with the United States, as they were able to include the harsher approach
that is data exclusivity.67
7. Cost-Sharing approach & Developing Countries
However, developing countries can be in a good position to negotiate a
cost sharing approach—more than the bans on misappropriation approach—to
challenge the demand of the United States for data exclusivity approach.68
Recently, this approach was successfully negotiated by the Korean
government in its FTA with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).69
Moreover, the Indian government has considered the cost sharing approach as
one of several options, while resisting data exclusivity in its negotiation with
the USTR.70
C. Data Exclusivity Approach
Under the data exclusivity approach, the interests of the originator
company are paramount; in effect, this approach creates a new monopoly for
originator companies, even when there is no patent registered.71 Moreover, the
data exclusivity regime also seeks to accommodate, to the greatest extent, the
interests of the originator companies; a feat this approach accomplishes by
64. Id. at 481–82.
65. Reichman, supra note 44, at 15–16.
66. Id.; see also Weissman, supra note 14, at 10.
67. Id.
68. Reichman, supra note 44, at 15–16.
69. Reichman, supra note 49, at 34.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in
the context of innovation and market access, (2004), available at https://www.iprsonline.org/unctadic
tsd/bellagio/docs/Pugatch_Bellagio3.pdf (discussing how the European Commission, a High Level
Group, was tasked with “propos[ing] a new agenda to improve the framework for competitiveness in
the pharmaceutical industry to improve the framework for competitiveness in the pharmaceutical
industry.”).
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delaying the entry of generic products for a fixed time period.72
Developed countries have implemented this approach in their drug
regulatory system.73 The two existing prototypes are the U.S. and the European
Union.74 The U.S. includes this in section 355 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1997.75 The period of data exclusivity in the U.S. is five years
for NCEs, and three years for new uses of old drugs.76 Endorsing an even more
expansive data protection period than the U.S., in December of 2003, the
European Parliament harmonized the level of data exclusivity to “8 years data
exclusivity plus 2 years as marketing exclusivity and one additional year for
new use of old entity.”77
The supporters of data exclusivity have justified it as the only means
available to encourage research and development in new pharmaceutical
products and to guarantee fair compensation for the efforts made by the
originator companies.78 It should be noted that the years between the late 1990s
and early 2000s saw a decline in the number of new drugs approved: in 1996,
fifty-three NCEs were approved and by 2000, that number had fallen to only
twenty NCEs approved as most research-based companies focus development
of new delivery systems and new uses.79
The disadvantages of data exclusivity include the following: it will delay
the entry of generic products in the market, thus impeding consumer access to
affordable medicine;80 it is unethical to ask the generic company to duplicate
clinical trials;81 it is considered a form of double protection if there is a patent,
as both are justified by the cost of investment;82 it can make compulsory
licenses of patents ineffective;83 and the concept of data exclusivity is
inconsistent with the legislative intent of the TRIPs Agreement: There is no
uniform interpretation of Article 39.3, and data exclusivity was rejected by
WTO members.84
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
INT’L FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS & ASS’NS,
ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 3
(2007) [hereinafter IFPMA].
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1. Data Exclusivity versus Patent
Data exclusivity and patents are the most important intellectual property
rights related to the pharmaceutical industry. 85 These two forms of IPR differ
in terms of the scope, rights conferred, obligations, duration, and related
authority.86 Legally, data exclusivity and patents are discrete forms of
protection, mutually exclusive in their operation and effect.
In addition, data exclusivity is the expression of a trade secret, which is in
itself a distinct form of intellectual property. The originator companies request
such protection in exchange for submitting studies for approval in the Drug
Regulatory Authority to recoup their cost in conducting such trials. 87 On
average these trials cost $800 U.S. dollars and take ten to fifteen year to
complete. The fruits of these labors see one in every 5,000 molecules
investigated obtain the FDA’s approval for marketing.88
A patent system was developed to encourage inventions in order to
disseminate this knowledge for the public in order to benefit from it. As
concerns pharmaceuticals, patents are granted to the inventions, embodied in a
new drug.89
The rights conferred by the patent are to exclude others from making,
using, selling, offering for sale, importing, or circulating the patented product.90
Data exclusivity prevents reliance on the originator test data, and thus limits the
possibility of using these data to evaluate the generic product.91 Therefore, data
exclusivity is considered to provide less expansive protection than patents,
because it does not prevent other generic companies from generating their own
data and then seeking marketing approval for their product.92
A National Drug Regulatory Authority grants exclusivity automatically
after the originator product has been approved for marketing, done without any
request from the originator product company and irrespective of its patent
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Andy Gray, Access to Medicines and Drug Regulation in Developing Countries: A
Resource Guide for DFID, DFID HEALTH SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE 1, 1–4 (Oct. 2004), available
at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18246en/s18246en.pdf.
88. Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Geochemical Products
Under Free Trade Agreements 2, ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Moving the Pro-development IP
Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods in Health, Education and Learning, Bellagio (Nov. 29–
Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/event/2008/12/report31.pdf.
89. Pugatch, supra note 71, at 22.
90. INT’L FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS & ASS’NS, DATA
EXCLUSIVITY: ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 16–17 (2011), available at
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/IFPMA_2011_Data_Exclusivity__En_Web.pdf
91. Junod, supra note 5, at 484.
92. Pugatch, supra note 71, at 6–7.
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situation. In contrast, a patent is only granted if the patent owners take the
affirmative effort of applying for one at the country’s patent office.93
Additionally, applying for a patent is considered to be a complex and costly
administrative procedure;94 a patent attorney and agent are needed to prepare
the application and to pay the application fees and annual fees or otherwise it
will be invalid.95 As opposed to the patent protection procedure, data
exclusivity does not stand on such formalities in order to receive protection, as
accomplished mainly by its automatically grant of protection following
marketing approval. Moreover, data exclusivity is considered to be a cheaper
alternative to patent, since no administrative procedure or fees are required to
obtain or maintain data exclusivity.96
To grant a patent, the invention should fulfill the patentability
conditions, namely novelty, non-obviousness and industrial applicability. The
protection period is twenty years from the day of the patent application.97
Under data exclusivity, there are several conditions that must be met in
order for data to be granted protection: first, the product at issue must be a new
chemical entity (NCE) of pharmaceutical or agricultural products; second, the
data must be unpublished; third, the generation of the data must have involved
considerable efforts; and, finally, those data are requested, not submitted
voluntarily, to get marketing approval.98
The duration and scope of data exclusivity varies between countries.99
Jordan, for example, grants five years of protection for NCEs and three years
for new use of an old chemical entity.100 Europe grants eight years data
exclusivity plus two years as marketing exclusivity and one year for new use.101
Other countries may not provide any data exclusivity and may apply other data
protection approaches that are compliant with the mandates found in TRIPS
Article 39.3.102
The unique importance of data exclusivity for originator companies
appears in many situations. An example is seen when there is no patent
registered in that country.103
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Junod, supra note 5, at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pugatch, supra note 71, at 6–7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Junod, supra note 5, at 484–485.
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This is the case in Jordan, in which data exclusivity was recognized as an
alternative source of protection in a situation where most originator products
not being protected through patents and data exclusivity was the alternative for
this protection.104
Moreover, data exclusivity is important when the product cannot be
patented, as happens with biological products and also where the new
development of an old product lacks the novelty criteria.105
Data exclusivity can also provide protection where other forms of IPR
cannot in a situation where the development period for the product was too long
and took most of the patent duration.106 To this point, between 1998 and 2004,
the U.S. FDA has approved 137 new drugs.107 Of these 137 products, 27 were
developed without patent protection, and it is for these 27 products that data
exclusivity provided some measure of protection where patent protection was
no longer viable.108
The table below is taken from Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical
Data Exclusivity, as presented in the context of innovation and market
access;109 the calculations are based on the U.S. FDA Orange Book.110 This
table gives examples for products where the protection granted by data
exclusivity extended beyond the product’s patent term duration.111
Table 1: Patent and data exclusivity expiration periods in the US for
selected drugs.112

PRODUCT

Purpose

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Taxol(Paclitaxel)

Breast Cancer/
Ovarian Cancer and others

Eprex
Arava
(Epeotin
(Leflunomide)
Alpah)
Severe Anemia Rheumatoid
Arthritis

Malpani, supra note 17, at 1.
Junod, supra note 5, at 485–86.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id.
Pugatch, supra note 71, at 6–7.
Id.; see also FDA, ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, 35TH ED. (2015), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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U.S. Market
Approval

Discovered in 1962.
Approved in 1994/1998.

2000

1998

U.S. Patent
Expiration

————————

2004

2001

U.S. DE
Expiration

2004(Orphan Drug)

2005

2003

The following table illustrates the differences between patents and data
exclusivity.
Table 2: Differences between patents and data exclusivity.

Parameter

Patent

Data exclusivity

Rationale

Encourage inventions
by giving protection
for 20 years in order
to disseminate this
knowledge for the
public in order to
benefit from it.
Patents are granted to
the inventions
embodied in a new
drug.
20 years

Recoup originator
companies cost in
conducting clinical
studies for approval
in the Drug
Regulatory Authority.

Duration

Differ from country
to country.
United States: 5
years protection for
new chemical entity
and years for new
use of old chemical
entity.
Europe: “8 years
data exclusivity plus
2 years as marketing
exclusivity and 1 year
for new use”, Some
countries do not
provide data
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Competent authority
Costs and administrative
procedure

Granting Procedure

Preventing Generic
Product Approval

Conditions

Public health/
compulsory license

Patent Office/
Ministry of Industry.
Application fees and
it should be paid
annually to maintain
the patent or
otherwise it will be
invalid
Applicant should
apply for patent in the
competent authority
and then this
application will be
studied to check if the
patent application
fulfills the criteria
then it can be granted
or not.
Generic company can
submit its registration
application to the
DRA and the DRA
can grant him
marketing approval.
Patent holder can stop
the registration
process, only by
placing a law suit
Protects an invention,
which must be novel,
non-obvious and
capable of industrial
applications.
Compulsory license
can be issued to
protect public health
so a generic product
can be produced.

[Vol. 20:2

exclusivity.
Drug Regulatory
Authority
No fees or
follow-up needed

Automatic right is
conferred from the
date of marketing
approval without any
request or
application.

The DRA will
prevent the marketing
approval of any
generic product till
the end of the data
exclusivity period

New chemical entity.
Undisclosed
information.
Considerable efforts.
Condition of
marketing approval.
Compulsory license
will not stop data
exclusivity.

NSOUR.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/10/2017 12:06 AM

TEST DATA PROTECTION

283

2. Effect of Data Exclusivity on Compulsory License
Data exclusivity represents a barrier for generic product approval, even if a
compulsory license is issued for this product.113 Compulsory licenses were
conceived by the Council of TRIPs in August of 2003 in order to solve the
problem raised by the Doha Declaration.114 The Doha Declaration emphasized
members’ right to access to medicine to all, in this declaration it reconfirms
member’s ability to issue compulsory licenses and to permit parallel
importation. Additionally, it proposed the extension of the transition period to
implement and enforce patents in the least developed countries and their
obligation to comply with data protection and mailbox-market-exclusivity
rules.115 The gap in the Doha Declaration was that it did not limit the rights
conferred by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement in case of issuance of
compulsory license.116
In past years, Canada issued compulsory licenses as a means to promote the
generic pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, the United States targeted this
system in 1987, with Canada ultimately acquiescing to U.S. pressure by passing
Bill C-22, legislation that had the effect of weakening the compulsory license
system as a whole.117 Nevertheless, Canada has established the PMPRB.118
This independent body monitors the potential increase in drug prices. If
excessive prices were to be found, then they can remove the protection against
compulsory license.119
In a country providing protection under data exclusivity regime, it will
be difficult to implement the compulsory licensing system unless there is a clear
provision to waive data exclusivity in the case of a compulsory license.120
Chile has implemented this in article 91(b) through (e) of Decree 153 (2005). 121
This article listed four grounds under which data protection could be revoked,
one of which is in the case of compulsory license issuance. Regarding this
113. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and
Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 320–21 (2008).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 2013–2014,
Bill C-22.
118. PMPRB, PATENTED MEDICINES PRICES REVIEW BOARD: ANNUAL REPORT 2013,
available at http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/Publications/Annual%20Reports/2013/2013Annual-Report_2013-09-15_EN.pdf.
119. Katherine M. Van Maren, Bartering with a Nation’s Health or Improving Access to
Pharmaceuticals? The United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J.
801, 812 (2004).
120. Weissman, supra note 14, at 201.
121. See Chile’s Decree 153
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exception to data exclusivity’s reach, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
included Chile on the priority watch list. The USTR and big Pharma use the
watch list and bilateral agreements as their weapon to impose data exclusivity
and a linkage system.122 In 2006, the USTR placed forty-eight countries on the
priority watch list, twenty-five of which were criticized for data exclusivity and
patent-registration linkage.123
Avoiding the ire of the U.S., and in contrast to Chile’s position on scope
of data exclusivity protection, the European Commissioner confirmed that a
data exclusivity regime would disallow, or at least delay, European member
states from using compulsory licenses to permit the market entry of a generic
alternative to Tamiflu in case of a Bird Flu pandemic.124
Developing countries have requested assurances that data exclusivity
and patent/registration linkage will not prevent the use of TRIPS flexibilities as
a compulsory license.125 Therefore, the USTR issued side letters that reassure
that the IPR provisions of the FTAs will not prevent access to medicines for
all.126
Developing countries should resist efforts by the United States to
implement registration-related IPRs.127 If countries have already incorporated
these provisions, as with Jordan, they should instead revise their national laws
in order to mitigate the effects of these clauses based on the new trade policy
of the United States for data exclusivity to allow exceptions to promote public
health and access to medicines conforming to TRIPS and Doha Declaration.128
D. Public Health Variants of the Data-Exclusivity Approach
Despite the data exclusivity’s privileging of originator companies, there
are seven variants that may decrease the harmful effects of data exclusivity. 129
Unfortunately, some of these variants cannot be applied by some countries
because of obligations found within their bilateral agreements.130 These
variants are:

122.
123.
124.

Baker, supra note 113, at 300.
Id; IFPMA, supra note 84.
Judit Sanjuan et al., Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data: A Policy Proposal, KEI
RESEARCH PAPER 1 (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/data/CPTech-TestData.pdf.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 331.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 342.
129. Correa, Protecting Test Data, supra note 88, at 11–12.
130. Id.
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1. New Chemical Entities (NCEs): Restrict data exclusivity to New
Chemical Entities (NCEs), this variant is in compliance with
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. This excludes new uses of
old chemical entities, new dosage forms or new methods of
administering drugs.131
2. Unpublished Information: Data exclusivity will be restricted to
unpublished information.132 If the test data was published, then the
generic companies can rely on this published data to prove the
safety and efficacy in order to obtain the marketing approval by
conducting the bioequivalence study only.133 Weissman said “tying
data exclusivity to lack of disclosure gives pharmaceutical
companies an incentive not to publish their clinical testing data.”134
Unitectra is a Swiss technology transfer organization that supports
scientists from Basel;135 Bern and Zurich Universities to
commercialize their research results.136 This organization ensures
that researchers’ rights to publish research results and the university
will reserve the full publication rights, which will be delayed for a
period of three months to enable the collaborating company to
apply for patents.137 If the commercial company did not publish the
research within one year, then the collaborating university has the
right to do so to facilitate data sharing.138
3. Waiving data-exclusivity protection in cases of compulsory
licensing: In case of the issuance of a compulsory license, the
generic company is still required to submit clinical trials.139
Therefore, data exclusivity should be waived in such cases.140
4. Waive data exclusivity protection in cases of having patent:141
The basis of this waiver is that the originator will recoup his
investment through the product patent, with no need for data
exclusivity.142
5. Compulsory licensing system for registration data: The proposal
in this case is that countries should be free to determine conditions
under which compulsory licenses should be granted over
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Adanda, supra note 10, at 168–70.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Adanda, supra note 10, at 168–70.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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registration data.143 Jordan cannot apply this variant, as the grounds
for issuing compulsory license is specified in the JOR-US FTA.144
6. Shortening the term of data exclusivity: Weissman stated that
any country can decide to shorten the exclusivity years as the five
or ten years were not based on any criteria.145
7. Start date of data exclusivity: a country can consider the start date
for granting data exclusivity is the first registration of the product
worldwide.146
These seven variants will ensure fair access to clinical data and it will
reserve the intellectual right properties.147
III. TEST DATA PROTECTION IMPLEMENTATION IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
Members of the WTO have applied the obligation of TRIPS Article 39.3 in
different ways that suited their needs and interests.148 The United States and
the European Union have applied the data exclusivity approach even prior to
the TRIPS agreement.
According to the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA), many countries have
entered into bilateral or regional agreements, or adopted into their legislation
data exclusivity regime to protect test data against unfair commercial use and
disclosure.149 It should be noted that some countries, such as India, did not
apply the data exclusivity approach through relying into the marketing approval
of other countries.150
I will discuss the practical implementation of different approaches of test
data protection in the following countries:
United States: The first country implemented data exclusivity
system in 1984. Many originator companies are based in the United
States. Also, the United States has signed many bilateral
agreements with the intent of encouraging other countries to follow
suit by implementing their own data exclusivity approach.
Canada: A developed country famous for its generic industry,

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
SATWANT REDDY & GURDIAL SINGH SANDHU, REPORT OF STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN THE CONTEXT OF DATA PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 39.3 OF
TRIPS AGREEMENT 13–15 (2007), available at http://chemicals.nic.in/DPBooklet.pdf.
149. G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required
by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 49 (2003).
150. REDDY & SANDHU, supra note 148, at 13–15.
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which adopted the data exclusivity approach in 1995 as a means to
fulfill obligations required by NAFTA.
The European Union: Many originator companies are based in the
European Union; therefore, they have implemented data exclusivity
approach in 1987.
India: Famous for its generic industry and has been listed on the
special 301 Priority Watch List since 1989. The practice in India
is to rely on other countries approval without requesting test data.
Egypt: A developing Arab country, considers the reliance on the
originator submitted data of the originator product to approve a
generic product is not an act of unfair commercial use.
A. United States
Grounded in the Hatch-Waxman Act,151 data exclusivity became the chosen
system in the United States beginning in1984.152 The Hatch-Waxman Act
aimed to balance the rights of the originator company, so as to encourage them
to invest more in discovering new products, with the need for access to
medicine through the approval of generic companies.153 This act provides data
exclusivity for five years for NCEs, calculated from the date of marketing
approval of the originator’s product, and three years for new clinical
information.154 Moreover, this act lengthened the patent duration from
seventeen to twenty and granted a five-year patent term extension in order to
compensate originators for administrative delays in patent registration.155
In addition to the Hatch-Waxman Act there are two further types of
marketing exclusivity: orphan drug exclusivity and pediatric exclusivity.156
In the U.S., a five-year data exclusivity period is codified by federal
statute,157 and provides that, during this five year exclusivity, the generic
company cannot apply for registration of its generic.158 In practice, the generic
product’s market entry will usually be delayed by approximately six-and-a-half

151. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, §
101, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) and 35 U.S.C. § 156) [hereinafter
Wax-Hatchman Act].
152. Shreya Matilal, Do Developing Countries Need a Pharmaceutical Data-exclusivity
Regime? 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 268, 269 (2010).
153. Daniel Acquah, Extending the Limits of Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Data
Outside the EU—Is There a Need to Rebalance? 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 256, 260–
61 (2014).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Junod, supra note 5, at 488–89.
157. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii) (2012).
158. Junod, supra note 5, at 493.
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years. This additional delay results because the FDA typically takes eighteen
months to consider a generic candidate’s application,159 though the only
condition that a generic producer must satisfy is to have a new chemical entity
that had not previously been approved by the FDA.160 This marketing
exclusivity is considered to be a very strong form of protection because it
cannot be challenged, unlike a granted patent.161 The only case where the
exclusivity period is reduced to four years is in the event a generic company
challenges the validity of the patent and applies for certificate IV.
As noted in the foregoing paragraph, the sole condition to be met predicate
to the five-year exclusivity grant is that the product must be a new chemical
entity that has never been approved in the FDA;162 thus, an applicant need not
provide any evidence of significant therapeutic advance or innovation. This
application is usually submitted through a 505(b)(1) NDA application. Ester
and salt forms of a compound are not considered to be new chemical entities.163
An enantiomer version of the racemate drug is also not considered to be as new
chemical entity, but at best it may receive three years of exclusivity.164
As with the five-year data exclusivity period, the corresponding three-year
period of marketing exclusivity for new clinical information is incorporated by
federal statute.165 Unlike the five-year exclusivity period, however, a generic
company can apply for its ANDA file during the three-year exclusivity period,
and get tentative approval. This perk of the three-year period is available to
both originator and generic companies.166 The new changes that can benefit
from the three-year exclusivity period are new indication, new strength, and
new dosage form, new routes of administration, new dosage schedule and new
studied population.167
A generic company can benefit from this marketing regime if it submits its
own data. Other conditions must be met to receive the three years of data
exclusivity, including the requirement that the applicant should sponsor or
conduct clinical trials that are germane to the data the producer must provide
the regulatory authority in order to get approval of this new change.168
This marketing exclusivity only protects the new change and not the already
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Junod, supra note 5, at 495.
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii), (j)(5)(D)(ii) (2012).
Junod, supra note 5, at 494.
Id.
Id.
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approved drug; so a generic company can market its product without the new
addition.169
The originator companies based in the United States are requesting a longer
exclusivity period, like the one available in the European Union: that is, to
extend the exclusivity period to ten years.170
The marketing exclusivity information is available in the Orange Book
website.171
B. Canada
In 1995, Canada implemented data exclusivity system into section
C.08.004.1 of its Food and Drug Regulations. This incorporation was a result
of the obligations required by NAFTA.172 Specifically, Article 1711 of NAFTA
requires the protection of confidential information submitted for governmental
authorities for the purpose of approving a pharmaceutical product for five
years.173 This was weakened by the judicial ruling of the Federal Court of
Appeal in 1998 in the case of Bayer Inc. v. Canada. The court held that the
approval of a generic product on the basis of proving equivalency with the
originator product with the bioequivalence study is not considered as
reliance.174 In this case, Bayer had filed a new drug submission (Drug X) for a
new product that had no patent and which had as its active ingredient one used
previously in Drug Z, used for the treatment of certain animal disease.175
Furthermore, the same active ingredient was used in Drug Y outside Canada to
treat another human disease other than the one applied by Bayer.176 The issue
in this case was whether to grant Bayer the five-year exclusivity period as per
Canadian law, or whether to deny protection in this instance, since the active
ingredient was already approved in Drug Z for animal disease. The court held
that the relevant law was applicable to Drug X.
The aforementioned judicial interpretation broadens the application of data
exclusivity to those drugs approved in Canada but not for human diseases.
Subsequently, the Federal Court of Appeal held that Section C.08.004.1 does
169. Id. at 496.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Pei-kan Yang, Current Development of Canada’s Data Exclusivity Regime: How Does
Canada React to NAFTA, TRIPS and Dangle Between Pharmaceutical Innovation and Public Health?
4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 65 (2009).
173. Food and Drug Law Group, Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Developments in Canadian Law
Relating to Food, Drugs, Devices, and Cosmetics as of December 1992, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 323,
335 (1994).
174. Yang supra note 172, at 65.
175. Id.
176. Id.

NSOUR.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

290

4/10/2017 12:06 AM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 20:2

not apply if the Minister did not physically examine the originator test data
when approving a generic product.177 Therefore, the Minister can approve a
generic product based on the bioequivalence study before the five-year period
has elapsed.178 This rule was criticized by the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), which declared that this rule was not
consistent with Canada’s NAFTA obligations; consequently, the United States
included Canada on its Special 301 Watch List in 2003.179
As a result of this pressure, the Canadian government amended its
regulation in 2006.180 The new amendments extended the data exclusivity to
eight years for a new chemical entity and six months for pediatric studies. Also,
it has extended the concept of reliance to cover the governmental examination
of test data when approving a generic product. Additionally, the generic
company cannot file its product for six of the eight years in the exclusivity
period, to then be followed by a two-year no-marketing period. These
amendments have been criticized for their negative impact on access to
affordable medicines.181
Despite such criticisms, however, the new amendments do contain some
provisions that mitigate the negative impact of data exclusivity, such as
narrowing the scope of protection to innovative drugs, meaning that new
indications or dosage forms are not entitled to data exclusivity.182 An
innovative drug is defined as “a drug that contains a medicinal ingredient not
previously approved in a drug by the Minister and that is not a variation of a
previously approved medicinal ingredient such as a salt, ester, enantiomer,
solvate or polymorph.”183 The new data exclusivity regime is only applicable
for innovative drugs that are marketed in Canada; if it was withdrawn from the
market no data exclusivity will be offered.184 It should be noted in this context
that an active ingredient that has been previously approved will not be granted
the data exclusivity period
Additionally, the new amendments encourage pediatric research by
including a six-month exclusivity protection period if the generic producer’s
application was filed within the first five years of the eight-year period.185 The
new amendments allow the generic company to file under Canada’s Access to
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Yang supra note 172, at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

NSOUR.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/10/2017 12:06 AM

TEST DATA PROTECTION

291

Medicines Regime (CAMR), during the new filing period of the six years.
CAMR is only applicable to generic medicines imported to treat HIV/AIDS
and malaria and other medicines to developing and least developed countries.
This is grounded in C.07.003, Division 7 of Food and Drug Regulation entitled
“Sale of Drugs for the Purposes of Implementing the General Council
Decision”.186
C. The European Union
Prior to adopting the data exclusivity approach, the European Union
protected pharmaceutical test data through established trade secrets law, with
Union members employing different approaches to implementation.187 In 1987,
the E.U. introduced the data exclusivity period, in which a generic product that
is “essentially similar”188 may rely on the test data of the originator product
after the expiration of the data exclusivity period. The stated reason for this
exclusivity period was in order to give the originator protection in countries
that did not grant patents for medicinal products,189 such as in countries like
Spain and Portugal that did not grant patents until 1992. However, this
rationale for mandating an exclusivity period is no longer applicable, as all the
European countries grant strong patent protection to medicinal products.190 The
directive of the data exclusivity was consolidated in 2001 in a single Code
Directive 2001/83/EC.191 Data exclusivity is included in Article 10.1(a)(iii) of
this Code Within the E.U.’s approach, the data exclusivity starts from the time
of the first marketing approval of a medicinal product in any country
maintaining membership in the E.U. There are four durations of data
exclusivity provided by this article:192
Ten-year mandatory period: for medicinal products that are
approved through the centralized procedure at EMEA which is
“high-tech” products. High-tech products are biotechnology and
products that represent a significant innovation or therapeutic
advance.193
186. Id.
187. Matital, supra note 152, at 270. See also Sanjuan, supra note 124.
188. See Sanjuan, supra note 124.
189. Junod, supra note 5, at 205.
190. Id. at 502.
191. Directive 2001/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001
on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2001 O.J. (L 311), 67 (EC),
replacing Council Directive 87/21, 1987 O.J. (L 015) 36 (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:311:0067:0128:en:PDF.
192. Junod, supra note 5, at 503–04.
193. Id.
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Six-year minimum period: for all medicinal products approved
through either national or mutual recognition procedures.194
Six-year minimum period capped by the patent duration:
Greece, Spain and Portugal have chosen this option of data
exclusivity period. If a supplementary protection certificate is
issued to cap for this period at the instant the patent protecting the
medicinal product expires.195
Ten-year optional period: members can either apply six or ten
year data exclusivity period’s. Extension of the period to ten years
should be based on the necessity of public health and applied for all
medicinal products without any discrimination.196 Members
applied this duration are Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg. The
notion of “reliance” refers to reliance of the agency in the originator
test data when approving the generic product which is similar to the
United States interpretation.197
The only requirement needed to grant data exclusivity in the European
Union is that it must be a new medicinal product. This directive does not require
that NCEs under consideration receive prior .198
Unlike the United States, the European Union did not grant data exclusivity
periods for the modification of the same medicinal product, such as with new
indications. Additionally, in the European Union, a generic product can be
marketed with the new modification after the expiration of the data exclusivity
period granted to the original originator product.199 That approach was
confirmed by the decision of the European Court of Justice in 1998.200
In July 2001 the European Union initiated a revision of its legislation
related to pharmaceuticals, including data exclusivity.201 The originator
companies requested the harmonization of the data exclusivity period to be ten
years,202 as the different durations created confusion.203 They also requested
three years of data exclusivity for the modifications done on original medicinal
products such as new indications, an approach similar to that of the United

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 506.
Junod, supra note 5, at 506.
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 511–14.
Id.
Id.
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States.204 While the European generic industry requested the harmonization of
the data exclusivity period between all the European Union members to be five
years similar to the United States205 and rejected the line extension exclusivity
period based on the decision held by the European Court of Justice in 1998.206
In April 2004 the revised directive was published, and the implementation date
was in October 30 2005.207
The new revised directive is applicable to all new drugs approved through
either centralized or mutual recognition procedure.208 The new formula is
8+2+1;209 the data exclusivity will last for eight years from the time of
marketing approval of the originator product, followed by two years of
marketing exclusivity in which the generic product can be filed but cannot be
marketed until the end of the ten-year period.210 The generic company can
market its product even if the originator product was withdrawn from the
market.211 A Bolar provision was added allowing the generic companies to do
their tests before the expiration of the related patent.212 New use was granted
an additional year of data exclusivity for one time only, provided two
conditions are met: first, the product must have been submitted for approval
during the first eight years of the data exclusivity period; and, second, the new
use must have significant clinical benefit as compared to the existing usage.213
Other modifications such as new dosage form or new strengths were not eligible
for this period.214 During the additional one-year new use exclusivity period,
the generic product cannot be marketed even for the old use.215
Additionally, switching from Rx (prescription) to OTC (over-the counter)
will be granted one-year protection period if the switch was based on significant
clinical or preclinical testing.216 The generic company can market its product
as a prescription product.217

204. Junod, supra note 5, at 511–14.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Junod, supra note 5, at 511–14.
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212. Id.
213 Id.
214. Id.
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216. Junod, supra note 5, at 511–14.
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D. India
There is no distinct law to protect the disclosure of confidential information
in India;218 existing provisions regarding the undisclosed information of
pharmaceuticals can be found in India’s Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (as
corrected up to November 30, 2004) rule 53219 provides that the drug regulator
should not disclose any confidential information to a third party without prior
written approval from relevant superior officials.220 In addition, India has
implemented many rules related to patents that aim to increase access to
medicines while still complying with TRIPS obligations; such obligations
include restricting the scope of patentability, increasing the grounds for
compulsory license issuance.221 Since 2007, the European Union and India
have been in negotiations to reach consensus on the terms of a bilateral
agreement between the two countries; however, as of now, these negotiations
have failed to produce any such agreement.222
In 2005, India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare amended Schedule
Y of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules (2005).223 These new amendments waive
the requirements of the toxicological and clinical of new drugs for life
threatening diseases, as deemed appropriate by the drug regulator.224 In 2004,
an Inter-ministerial committee was established as a consultative group on this
matter, and in 2007, this committee released the Reddy Report.225 The Reddy
Report concluded that existing legal provisions were inadequate to meet the
obligations imposed by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. Consequently,
the Reddy Report recommended existing law be amended in order to be in
compliance with Article 39.3.226
The report proposed numerous scenarios, one of which envisioned a data
protection period of five years for a pharmaceutical product that contains a new
chemical entity from the date of first marketing authorization anywhere in
world.227 This report recommends some conditions for applying data
protections, such as the recommendation that protection should be granted only

218. REDDY & SANDHU, supra note 148, at 30 –33.
219. Noti. ***[No. F. 28-10/45-H (1)], Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare [Department of Health].
220. Id.
221. Acquah, supra note 153, at 273.
222. Id. at 272.
223. REDDY & SANDHU, supra note 148, at 30–33.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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227. Id.

NSOUR.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/10/2017 12:06 AM

TEST DATA PROTECTION

295

for new chemical entity and not for new uses or other modifications.228 Also,
this protection term for a patented drug would be limited to the patent term in
India. Further, the report suggests a maximum period of twenty-four months,
from the time of an originator’s first marketing approval anywhere in the world,
in which the originator company should apply for marketing approval in India.
It should be launched within six months of the approval date in India. 229
Another condition was to start the data protection period from the first
marketing approval date anywhere in the world. The Reddy Report justified its
recommendations regarding the implementation of a more expansive data
protection system and other related intellectual property rights,230 by
hypothesizing that India’s current protection legislation, that which the Report
found to be inadequate, could lead to the international perception of India as a
country that did not fully protect innovation.231
Consequently, this negative image of India in the international community
could limit India’s ability to enter many conventions, such as the
Pharmaceuticals
Inspection
Convention/Pharmaceuticals
Inspection
Cooperation Scheme (PIC/S).232 This in turn could negatively impact a generic
producer’s ability to export to other countries, because the United States will
increase the number of bilateral agreements with other countries. These
bilateral agreements have stricter intellectual property rights that prohibit
parallel importation than those encompassed in TRIPS.233
India has been listed on the Special 301 Priority Watch List from the first
report on 1989 until now.234 On its submission for the Special 301 of 2014, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) requested
to include India on the priority watch list,235 based on India’s current
insufficient intellectual property legislation and the market access barriers.
Lack of data protection was one point mentioned on this report.236 For example,
India’s current practice when granting regulatory approval is to rely on the
approval of another country when approving an originator product, and there is
no need to submit the test data.237 According to (PhRMA), this practice is
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
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Id.
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PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, SPECIAL 301
SUBMISSION 24–29 (2014) , available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014-special-3
01-submission.pdf [hereinafter PhRMA].
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inconsistent with Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement and ultimately leads to
unfair commercial use.238
E. Egypt
As with India, Egypt does not provide data protection for test data
submitted by the originator companies. Article 56 paragraph 2 of the Egyptian
IP law states “The competent authorities who receive such information shall
protect it against disclosure and unfair commercial use from the date of its
submission to the competent authorities until it is no longer confidential, or for
a period not exceeding five years, whichever comes first.”239 According to
Article 56, the Egyptian health authority does not consider reliance on an
originator’s submitted data to approve a generic product as an act of unfair
commercial use, a determination based on the rationale that this reliance does
not involve the disclosure of the test data to the generic company. 240
Like India, PhRMA requested to list Egypt on the Priority Watch list of
2014 because of its deteriorating intellectual property environment and because
of barriers to market access.241 The above practices in implementing test data
protection is proof that members of the WTO can apply the obligations of
Article 39.3 in different ways that suited their needs and interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
Each WTO member should choose the right approach that best suits its
country, taking public welfare issues into consideration. To ensure that public
welfare issues have received due consideration, WTO members should reevaluate the approach they have implemented/employed, to evaluate its effect
on the public health and access to medicines relative to other approaches and
benefit from other members experiences.
Data exclusivity provisions were not the best option for developing
countries, as they have undermined people’s accessibility to affordable
medicine and have had a negative impact on the local pharmaceutical industry.
We argue that the bans-on-misappropriation approach facilitates the
early entry of a generic product directly after the originator product is approved,
and takes maximum advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. According to Article
39.3 of TRIPS, test data must be protected in accordance with relevant domestic
238. Id.
239. Law No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights), Al Jarida AlRasmiyya, 3 June 2002, (Egypt), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126540.
240. Id.
241. PhRMA, supra note 234.
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laws on unfair competition. Unfairness is limited to the means of access to the
data by the competitor, not by the regulators.
The test data of the originator will be protected against what national law
defines as unfair use of the data, so reliance on original test data when assessing
the bioequivalence study of a generic company will not be considered to be
unfair. This approach is considered to be a very good alternative to the data
exclusivity approach for developing countries.

